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Information Validates the Prior: A Theorem on Bayesian
Updating and Applications†
By Navin Kartik, Frances Xu Lee, and Wing Suen*
We develop a result on expected posteriors for Bayesians with heterogenous priors, dubbed information validates the prior (IVP).
Under familiar ordering requirements, Anne expects a (Blackwell)
more informative experiment to bring Bob’s posterior mean closer
to Anne’s prior mean. We apply the result in two contexts of games
of asymmetric information: voluntary testing or certification, and
costly signaling or falsification. IVP can be used to determine how
an agent’s behavior responds to additional exogenous or endogenous information. We discuss economic implications. (JEL C11,
D82, D84)
Bayesian agents revise their beliefs upon receiving new information. From an
ex ante point of view, however, one cannot expect information to systematically
alter one’s beliefs in any particular direction. More precisely, a fundamental property of Bayesian updating is that beliefs are a martingale: an agent’s expectation of
his posterior belief is equal to his prior belief. But what about an agent’s expectation of another agent’s posterior belief when their current beliefs differ? Relatedly,
should agents expect new information to systematically affect their disagreement,
and if so, how? These questions are not only of intrinsic interest, but tackling them
is useful for economics with asymmetric information.
Information Validates the Prior.—In Section I, we develop the following general result. Let Ω
 ⊂ ℝbe possible states. Bayesians Anne (A) and Bob (B) have
mutually known but different priors over Ω, with means mA and mB . A signal s will
be drawn from a known information structure or experiment . Let m  sB  denote Bob’s

posterior mean after observing the signal. Let E  A[   m  sB]  be Anne’s ex ante expectation
of Bob’s posterior mean under experiment .
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to Communication Games.” We thank Nageeb Ali, Ilan Guttman, Rick Harbaugh, Keri Hu, Alessandro Lizzeri,
Steve Matthews, Paula Onuchic, Ariel Pakes, Andrea Prat, Mike Riordan, Satoru Takahashi, Jianrong Tian, Enrico
Zanardo, Jidong Zhou, and various seminar and conference audiences for comments. We have benefited from
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Consider two experiments  and    ̃ , with more informative than 
 ̃ in the sense
of Blackwell (1951, 1953). Theorem 1 establishes that under familiar ordering
requirements,1
(1)

 ̃ 


mA  ≤(≥) mB  ⇒ E  A[  m  sB]    ≤(≥) E  A[  m  sB̃  ]  .


In words, if Anne has a lower (respectively, higher) prior mean than Bob, then Anne
predicts that a more informative experiment will, on average, reduce (respectively,
raise) Bob’s posterior mean by a larger amount than a less informative experiment.
Put differently, Anne expects more information to further validate her prior in the
sense of bringing Bob’s posterior mean closer to her prior mean. Of course, Bob
expects just the reverse. We refer to the result as “information validates the prior,”
IVP hereafter.
IVP has an implication about expected disagreement. A particular signal can
lead to larger posterior disagreement than prior disagreement. Nevertheless, IVP
implies (Corollary 1) that when beliefs’ disagreement is quantified by the difference
in means, both Anne and Bob predict that a more informative experiment will, on
average, reduce their posterior disagreement by more. At the extreme, both predict
zero posterior disagreement under a fully informative experiment—even though
each one’s expectation of the other’s posterior mean may be very different.
Applications.—IVP is a statistical result, which we believe is of intrinsic interest. Our paper shows why it is also instrumentally useful in games of asymmetric
information. After all, even in c ommon-prior environments, private information can
endow Anne, an informed agent, with a different belief about a fundamental than
Bob, an uninformed agent. In equilibrium, Anne anticipates how her actions will
affect Bob’s belief. Anne’s strategic incentives may depend on how she expects new
information to affect Bob, for which IVP is a useful tool. The new information
can be exogenous or endogenous, for example, owing to the behavior of still other
agents.
We develop these points in two contexts.
Voluntary Testing.—Section II studies voluntary testing or certification. An agent
has some private information about his true ability or product quality. He can choose
to undertake a costly test that provides an independent public signal of quality.
Gross of the testing cost, the agent’s payoff is the market’s posterior expectation of
his quality.
Proposition 1 establishes that under familiar informational assumptions, the more
(Blackwell) informative the test, the less the agent will choose to get tested. The
logic we elucidate, using IVP, is that because of pooling, the marginal type who
takes the test expects more informative tests to reduce the benefit of getting tested.
Proposition 1 offers economic insights. When market information is of concern,
a trade-off must be resolved between more informative tests and participation (cf.
Harbaugh and Rasmusen 2018). But in settings where information only affects
1
The priors must be l ikelihood-ratio ordered, and experiments must satisfy the monotone l ikelihood-ratio property (MLRP). These assumptions are unrestrictive if the state is binary.
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surplus division, e x ante efficiency improves with better tests because they reduce
the deadweight loss from testing. We further discuss implications for a monopolist
certifier’s test choice, generalizing Lizzeri’s (1999) observation about the emergence of uninformative tests.
Costly Signaling.—IVP is also useful in games of asymmetric information even
when the information asymmetry is eliminated in equilibrium by an agent’s own
behavior. Section III deploys IVP in a s ender-receiver game with lying costs (Kartik
2009) but explains how the logic also applies to canonical applications like education signaling (Spence 1973). Our concern is how exogenous information the
receiver obtains affects the sender’s signaling.
Proposition 2 establishes that, under reasonable conditions, better exogenous
information reduces the sender’s benefit from falsification to appear more favorable. Intuitively, the sender expects any favorable receiver belief he induces to get
neutralized more by better exogenous information. Costly falsification becomes
less attractive. Consequently, better exogenous information reduces wasteful signaling—every sender type is better off, even under full separation. We further discuss how this implies a strategic complementary when there are multiple, possibly
opposed, senders with bounded signal spaces.
Other Applications.—We believe IVP will be useful in other contexts too. Indeed,
the logic of IVP unifies aspects of mechanisms in some existing papers that study
models with heterogeneous priors under specific information structures. See, for
example, Yildiz (2004), Che and Kartik (2009), Van den Steen (2010, proposition
5), Hirsch (2016, proposition 8), and Sethi and Yildiz (2012, proposition 5). We
ourselves have used IVP to study information acquisition prior to disclosure (Kartik,
Lee, and Suen 2017).
I. Information Validates the Prior

Fix any finite (multi-)set of states Ω ≡ {ω1, … , ωL } ⊂ ℝ, with ω1 ≤ ⋯ ≤ ωL .
We denote a generic element of Ωby either ωor ωl. Fix a measurable space of signals,
(S, ), endowed with a σ-finite reference measure. An experiment is  ≡ {Pω }ω∈Ω,
where Pωis a probability measure over signals in state ω. We only consider experiments for which each P
 ωis absolutely continuous with respect to the reference
measure, so that a Radon-Nikodym derivative exists, denoted p( s | ω); this is the
probability density or mass function.2
Experiment  is (Blackwell) more informative than experiment ̃  ≡ {P̃ ω}ω∈Ω,
whose signal may be denoted s̃   ∈ Sfor clarity, if there is a Markov kernel Q( ⋅ |s)
such that for each ω ∈ Ωand every Σ
 ∈ ,
	
P ̃ ω( Σ) = ∫S   Q(Σ | s)  dPω ( s).

2
This permits the familiar definition of monotone likelihood ratio on the following page. Lehrer and Wang’s
(2020) “strong stochastic dominance” should be applicable more generally.
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This definition captures the statistical notion that 
 ̃ does not provide any information
beyond : state by state, the distribution of signals in ̃ can be generated by taking
signals from and transforming them through the state-independent kernel Q
 ( ⋅ ).
As established by Blackwell (1953), this notion is equivalent to that of being more
valuable than ̃ for decision-making in canonical senses.
An experiment is an MLRP experiment if there is a total order on S , denoted ⪰
(with asymmetric relation ≻
 ), such that the MLRP holds:
	
s′   ≻ s and ω
 ′   > ω ⇒ p(s′  | ω′ )p(s | ω)  ≥ p(s′  | ω)p(s | ω′ ).

 . We
Let β ∈ ΔΩdenote a belief, with β( ω)the probability ascribed to state ω
say that a belief β′  likelihood-ratio (LR) dominates belief β, written β ≤LR β′ , if for
all ω
 ′   > ω,
	
β′ (ω′ )β( ω)  ≥ β(ω′ )β′ (ω).

A pair of beliefs are likelihood-ratio ordered if one likelihood-ratio dominates the
other.
Anne (A) and Bob (B) are Bayesians with full-support priors on Ω, denoted by βA
 B.3 Given an experiment ,
and βBrespectively, with expectations or means mA and m
s
we denote individual i’s posterior mean by m  i  , computed by Bayes’ rule. Let E  i  [m  sj  ]
denote i’s ex ante expectation of j’s posterior mean.


If the individuals have the same prior, then E  A[   m  sB]   = E  A[   m  sA]   = mA by iterated expectation. Under different priors, the same conclusion holds when 
 is fully
informative (i.e., every signal reveals the state) because prior differences become
irrelevant. On the other hand, if is uninformative (i.e., no signal provides any

information), then E  A[   m  sB]   = mB . For the intermediate cases between fully informative and uninformative experiments, there is certain monotonicity under some
conditions.
THEOREM 1: Let βA   ≤L R βB and  and ̃ be MLRP experiments. If  is more informative than 
 ̃ , then
 ̃ 


	
mA   ≤ E  A[   m  sB]   ≤ E  A[  m  sB̃   ] ≤ mB ;


	

and

̃

mA   ≤ E  B [  m  sÃ  ]   ≤ E  B[  m  sA]   ≤ mB .

Theorem 1 says that under its ordering requirements,4 each individual i predicts
that a more informative experiment will, on average, bring the other’s posterior mean
closer to i ’ s prior. In this sense more information is expected to further validate one’s
prior, or more succinctly, information validates the prior. It bears emphasis that by
relabeling states (cf. footnote 3), information validates the prior in the sense of not
3
That is, m
 i ≡ ∑
 ω    ω βi(ω). We could just as well take mito be ∑ω    h(ω)βi(ω)for any increasing h : Ω → ℝ. (By
“increasing,” we mean “weakly increasing,” similarly for related terminology throughout this paper unless made
explicit otherwise.) This amounts to relabeling each state ωas h( ω).
4
The priors’ likelihood-ratio ordering may be viewed as without loss—the states can be relabeled—so long as
the experiments’ MLRP and beliefs’ means are understood with respect to the states’ relabeling.

VOL. 3 NO. 2

KARTIK ET AL.: INFORMATION VALIDATES THE PRIOR

169

only the mean state but the expectation of any increasing function of the state, such
as the probability of any { ωl, … , ωL }.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix A. For an illustration, suppose Bayesian
updating takes the canonical linear form: the posterior mean is a convex combination
of the prior mean and the signal, as is the case for any exponential family of signals
with conjugate prior (e.g., normal-normal). It then holds that for any signal s ∈ ℝ
under experiment , m  sj   = (1 − α  )  mj  + α    sfor some α   ∈ 
[0, 1]. Hence,
	
E  i  [m  sj  ] = (1 − α  )  mj  + α   mi.

The weight α  is larger when experiment is more informative, which implies
Theorem 1’s conclusions.
To shed light on the ordering requirements in Theorem 1, it is useful to decompose its conclusions. Each individual iexpects the other’s posterior mean to
(i) (Direction) move toward i’s prior mean under any experiment; for example,

E  A[   m  sB]   ≤ mB ;

(ii) (Undershooting) not move past i’s prior mean under any experiment; for

example, m
 A  ≤ E  A[  m  sB]  ;

(iii) (Intensity) move more ̃ when the experiment is more informative;

 
for example, E  A[  m  sB]   ≤ E  A[  m  sB̃  ]  .
Note that the third point implies the previous two given the observations before
the theorem about extreme experiments. The directional result (point i) does not
require priors to be likelihood-ratio ordered; given the experiment’s MLRP, the priors’ ordering by fi
 rst-order stochastic dominance (FOSD) is sufficient and is in fact
essentially necessary.5 Online Appendix B.1 shows that even with likelihood-ratio
ordered priors, the directional result can fail for a non-MLRP experiment. The
undershooting result (point ii) does not require any assumption on the experiment;
the priors’ likelihood-ratio ordering is sufficient and is in fact essentially necessary.6
The intensity result (point iii) does not require any assumption on the less informative experiment; the priors’ likelihood-ratio ordering and the more informative
experiment’s MLRP are sufficient. This is verified by studying the theorem’s proof,
which is fairly straightforward because the experiments are B
 lackwell ranked. We
leave to future research the question of whether less restrictive comparisons of
experiments would suffice.
Francetich and Kreps (2014) prove that conditional on any event being true, a
Bayesian’s expected posterior on that event (ignorant of the truth) is larger than
her prior; see also Good (1965). It can be shown that for a binary state, that result
Suppose 
mA  ≤ mB with 
βA  ≰F OSD βB 
. Then for some index 
k, ∑
 l≥k
   βB(ωl) < ∑l≥k
   βA(ωl)
. For an

MLRP-experiment that only reveals whether ω < ω
 kor ω ≥ ωk, it can be verified that E
 A[msB] > mB so long
as ω
 1 < ωL .

6
If β
 A  ≰LR
  βB , then so long as ω
 1 < ⋯ < ωL there is an M
 LRP-experiment such that E
 A[msB] < mA .
Specifically, let lbe any index such that β
 B(ωl+1)/βB (ωl) < βA (ωl+1)/βA (ωl), and consider 
 that fully reveals
every state except { ωl, ωl+1
 }, which are pooled together. Onuchic and Ray (2019, proposition 4) note a related point.
5
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and Theorem 1 are equivalent. Note that any priors and experiments satisfy the
theorem’s ordering assumptions with a binary state. More generally though, neither
result implies the other.
IVP has a noteworthy implication about expected disagreement. Consider measuring disagreement between beliefs by the distance in their means.7 Typically,
experiments can generate signals for which posterior disagreement is larger than
prior disagreement.8 But can individuals expect, ex ante, to disagree more after
observing more information?
COROLLARY 1: Let βA  ≤LR βBand  and ̃ be MLRP experiments. If  is more
informative than 
 ̃ , then for either iand j,
̃

	
E  i  [|m  si   − m  sj  |] ≤ E  i   [|m  si  ̃  − m  sj  ̃ |].
Corollary 1 says that—subject to the ordering hypotheses—more information
reduces expected disagreement when disagreement is measured by the (absolute)
difference in means. We omit a proof, as the corollary is equivalent to Theorem 1
because any signal from an M
 LRP experiment preserves the prior likelihood-ratio
ordering of beliefs and thus also the ordering by their means; moreover, for any
mi.
experiment and individual i, E  i  [ m  si  ] = 
Corollary 1 and IVP relate to the literature on merging of opinions initiated by
Blackwell and Dubins (1962). That literature establishes asymptotic merging under
general conditions; we are concerned instead with updating after just one observation.
In the following sections, we apply IVP to study games with a common prior but
asymmetric information.
II. Voluntary Testing

Model.—An agent has unknown ability or product quality q ∈ Q ⊂ ℝ, where Q
   e. The
is a finite set. There is a f ull-support prior π
 (q), whose expectation is denoted π
agent privately receives information, referred to as his type, t ∈ T ≡ 
[ t,  t¯] ⊂ ℝ
¯
from the density f(t | q)satisfying the strict MLRP. Without loss, we assume
E[q | t]  = t. The agent then chooses whether to take a test or not. If he takes the
test, a result or signal s ∈ Sis drawn from density g(s | q)with MLRP; sis conditionally independent of t. After observing whether the agent took the test—and
if so, the test result—a decision-maker or market forms belief δ ∈ ΔQand hires
the agent at a wage (or buys the product at a price) w = δ e, the market’s posterior
expectation of quality. Taking the test costs the agent c ≥ 0, and so the agent’s von
Neumann-Morgenstern payoff is w − cif he took the test and w
 if he did not.
Equilibrium.—Since the test is conditionally independent of the agent’s information, we can think of the market as updating in two steps: it first forms an “interim
7
The distance between individuals’ expectations is an interesting measure of disagreement but obviously coarse
and not without limitations. Zanardo (2017) studies disagreement axiomatically; he provides a result in the spirit of
our Corollary 1 for a family of disagreement measures that include the Kullback-Leibler divergence.
8
Yet no signal can polarize beliefs in the sense of FOSD (Baliga, Hanany, and Klibanoff 2013, theorem 1).

VOL. 3 NO. 2

KARTIK ET AL.: INFORMATION VALIDATES THE PRIOR

171

belief  ” about quality by updating its prior with what the agent’s action reveals about
his private information t; thereafter, if the agent took the test, it updates the interim
belief using the test result s . Accordingly, denote the market’s interim belief when
the agent takes the test (before observing the test result) as δ +and when the agent
 (t). Plainly, the agent of type t 
does not as δ−
 . The agent’s private belief is denoted β
will take the test if and only if (modulo indifference)
 ) ]   − c > δ e− ,
	
Es|t[ δ  e( s; δ+

 ) is the market's posterior expectation upon observing test result s
where δ   e(s; δ+
given interim belief δ +
 , and δ  e− is the no-test expected quality. The left-hand side of
the above inequality is strictly increasing in t: for any tH
   > tL,
 )] − Es|tL [ δ  e(s; δ+
 )] = ∑ [β(q | tH)  − β(q | tL)] Es|q[δ  e(s; δ+
 )]
	
Es|tH [ δ  e(s; δ+
q

 ) ] is increasing in q by the test’s MLRP, and
is strictly positive because E
 s|q[δ  e( s; δ+
 )strictly fi
 rst-order stochastically dominates β
 ( ⋅ | tL )by strict MLRP of the
β( ⋅ | tH
agent’s private information.9
Therefore, all (weak perfect Bayesian) equilibria are described by a cutoff
 ( t  ∗) 
t  ∗  ∈ Tsuch that the agent takes the test if t > t  ∗and does not if t < t  ∗. Let δ−
∗
and δ+
 ( t  ) denote the interim beliefs computed from Bayes’ rule given any interior cutoff t  ∗. Consistent with the expected gain from testing strictly increasing in
type, we restrict attention to equilibria in which if no type gets tested (t  ∗  =  t¯),
then the off-path interim belief upon testing is δ +
 ( t  ¯)  ≡ β(t  ¯); similarly, if all types
get tested (t  ∗  =  t), then the no-test o ff-path belief is δ−(  t)  ≡ β( t). Since intervals
¯
¯
¯
of signals preserve MLRP structure (Milgrom 1981, theorem 4), it holds that for
∗
∗
∗
 ( t  ) and δ+
 ( t  ) are likelihood-ratio ordered with all β
 ( t).
any t    ∈ T, δ−
LEMMA 1: A cutoff t  ∗is an equilibrium cutoff if and only if
(i)	
t  ∗is interior and
(2)

Es|t  ∗[δ  e(s; δ+
 (t  ∗))]  =  E
  
t  ∗] + c;
[t | t < 


(ii)	
t  ∗ =  tand Es| t[δ  e(s; π)]  ≥  t  + c; or
¯
¯
¯

=δ  e−(  t  ∗)

t¯and t  ¯ ≤ π  e  + c.
(iii)	
t  ∗ =  

We omit the routine proof. The characterization implies that an equilibrium
exists. There may be multiple equilibria. A key observation is that at any interior
equilibrium cutoff t  ∗,
	
δ  e−(  t  ∗)   = E[t | t < t  ∗] < t  ∗ ≤ Es|
 t  ∗[ δ  e(s; δ+
 (t  ∗))] ≤ δ  e+ ( t  ∗)  = E[t | t > t  ∗],

9
More precisely, our conclusion holds if Es|q
 [ δe( s; δ+
 ) ] is strictly increasing in q. Accounting for the possibility
that this function may only be weakly increasing would not materially affect what follows. The possibility is ruled
out when g (s | q)has the strict MLRP and δ +
  is nondegenerate.
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with at least one of the weak inequalities being strict. The weak inequalities follow
from IVP, as Theorem 1’s ordering hypotheses are satisfied. Intuitively, as the cutoff
type is pooled with all higher types, it expects the test to cause a downward revision
from the market’s interim quality expectation. The cutoff type is nevertheless willing to take the test because foregoing it would lead to an even worse expectation,
δ  e−(  t  ∗) . It follows that t  ∗− δ  e−(  t  ∗)   ≤ c; equality holds only with a fully informative test. With such a test, the setting is effectively one of costly voluntary disclosure (Jovanovic 1982, Verrecchia 1983). If the test is uninformative, then
 oney-burning
δ  e+(  t  ∗)   − δ  e−(  t  ∗)   = c; it is as if the agent can simply take a pure m
action.
Comparative Statics.—What happens when the test becomes (Blackwell) more
informative? IVP assures that the cutoff type expects the “disagreement” between
its private belief and the market’s interim belief δ +
 to shrink by more. The cutoff
type’s expected benefit of taking the test is thus lower. On the other hand, the payoff
from not taking the test, δ  e− , is unaffected. Consequently, fewer types should take the
test. Formally, we have the following result.
PROPOSITION 1: If the test becomes more informative, then the smallest and largest equilibrium cutoffs increase.
PROOF:
Consider two test distributions,   gand g ¯, with the latter more informative. Define
g
 ( t)) ] and R( t)¯ ≡ δ e−(  t)  + c; these correspond to the two sides
L(t; g) ≡ E  s|t[  δ  e( s; δ+
of equation (2). IVP (Theorem 1) implies that L(t;   g)   ≥ L(t;  g¯)for all t. We argue
below that the largest equilibrium cutoff increases;¯an analogous argument applies
to the smallest.
The conclusion is trivial if  t¯ ≤ π  e  + c, as Lemma 1 implies the largest equilibrium cutoff is t  ¯regardless of the test. So suppose  t¯ > π  e  + c, or equivalently,
L(t  ¯; g)  > R(t  ¯)for any g. If L( t;   g)   > R(t)for all t >  t, the only equilibrium cut¯
¯ follows. So suppose
L
 ( t;   g)   = R(t)for some
off under   gis  t, and the conclusion
¯
¯
intersection of
interior t. ¯Continuity and L( ⋅ ;   g)   ≥ L( ⋅ ;  g¯)imply that the largest
¯
L( ⋅ ;  g¯)and R( ⋅ )is at least as large as that of L( ⋅ ;   g) and R( ⋅ ). ∎
¯
Equilibria with extremal cutoffs are stable in the sense of best-response dynamics. Proposition 1’s comparative static extends to other stable equilibria, but it
can reverse for unstable equilibria, as is a common theme in games with multiple
equilibria.
Ex ante, the agent prefers a larger equilibrium cutoff because his ex ante expected
wage is π  ein any equilibrium, and a larger cutoff reduces the likelihood of having to take the test. Focusing on the largest equilibrium is thus justified on ex ante
utilitarian grounds if the agent’s wage is purely redistributive and information has
no efficiency benefit. Indeed, Proposition 1 implies that from this perspective more
informative tests and their largest equilibrium cutoffs are socially preferable—only
indirectly, because they lower the deadweight loss from testing.
Proposition 1’s lesson that more informative tests reduce testing participation
echoes and broadens a point made by Harbaugh and Rasmusen (2018) that fully
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informative tests do not maximize participation. Unlike them, we do not require
the agent to be perfectly informed about quality, and we compare any pair of
Blackwell-ranked tests. Their focus was on solving for the optimal test to minimize
the market’s mean squared error.
Certification by an Intermediary.—View the agent’s cost c as the price charged
by a monopolist testing firm or certifying intermediary who must offer a single test.
Momentarily take c as given. The monopolist then seeks to maximize the fraction
of agents who take the test, that is, to minimize the equilibrium cutoff. It follows
from Proposition 1 that (focusing on an extremal equilibrium) the monopolist will
choose the least informative test available if such a test exists—even if all available
tests are costless to perform, and a fortiori, if more informative tests are more costly.
In particular, if the uninformative test is available (and least costly), the monopolist will choose that. Consequently, when the monopolist can choose any test and
any price c , and we select the p rofit-maximizing equilibrium cutoff, it is optimal to
choose an uninformative test and price c = π  e  −  t. All types then get tested, and
¯
the monopolist makes the maximum possible profit subject to the agent’s minimum
10
payoff of  t.
¯
This discussion generalizes themes from Lizzeri (1999), who assumed a p erfectly
informed agent, endogenous pricing, and availability of all tests. Our analysis clarifies that the economic force favoring less informative tests does not turn on any
of these conditions—rather, even with a p artially informed agent, demand in a
profit-maximizing equilibrium at any price is higher when the monopolist chooses
a less informative test.
III. Costly Signaling

Our second application shows how IVP is useful in games with asymmetric information even when there may be no “disagreement” in equilibrium because of (full)
separation; rather, what is crucial is how information affects disagreement off the
equilibrium path.
A. Model
We consider communication with lying costs or costly falsification, following
Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007) and Kartik (2009) but adding exogenous
information. A sender and receiver share a common nondegenerate prior about
a state ω
 ∈ 
{0, 1}. The sender privately learns his type t ∈ [0, 1], normalized to
equal his private belief that ω
 = 1, drawn from a density f ( t | ω). Our normalization
implies that f ( ⋅ )has the MLRP. The sender sends a report r ≥ 0at a cost c( r, t),
elaborated below. The receiver forms a belief based on both r and an additional signal s ∈ ℝthat, conditional on the state ω, is drawn independently of tor rfrom a
density g ( s | ω)  > 0. Without loss, we assume g ( ⋅ )satisfies the MLRP. The signal s 
can either be the receiver’s private information or publicly observed after the sender
10
If the type distribution under the prior has a strictly decreasing density, then δe+( t)− δe−( t)is strictly increasing and hence tis the unique cutoff equilibrium when the test is uninformative and c = πe− t.
¯
¯
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has acted. Denote the receiver’s posterior expectation of the state by E
 [ω | r, s]. The
sender’s von Neumann-Morgenstern payoff is linear in this expectation; specifically,
his payoff is
	
E[ω | r, s]  − c(r, t).
The receiver’s belief updating can be analyzed in two steps: based on the sender’s
report r , she forms an interim belief π
 (r) ∈ 
[0, 1]about the state (all beliefs refer to
the probability of ω = 1) and then uses this interim belief to further update from
the signal s to form a posterior belief about the state β
 ( s; π(r)) . By Bayes’ rule,
(3)

πg(s | 1)
  
    .
β( s; π)  =  _________________
πg(s | 1) + (1 − π)g( s | 0)

The expected payoff of a type-tsender from report r is thus
	
Es|t[β(s; π(r)) ]  − c(r, t),

where E
 s|tdenotes t’s expectation over the signal s . The first term in the above display is strictly increasing in π
 (r)because a higher interim belief raises the receiver’s
posterior after any signal.
∂ c(t, t) / ∂ r = 0 for
Assume the cost function 
c(r, t)is smooth with 
all t, that is, the marginal cost of lying when telling the truth is zero. Furthermore,
∂  2c( r, t)/∂ r  2  > 0 > ∂  2c( r, t)/∂ r∂ tfor all t, r, that is, the marginal cost of sending
a higher report is increasing in the report and decreasing in the type.
A Single-Crossing Condition.—Due to the receiver’s exogenous information, the
above cost assumptions do not guarantee a suitable single-crossing property. Consider
the sender’s indifference curves in the space of his report rand the receiver’s interim
belief π. For any type t, these indifference curves slope upward for r > t: costly
lying requires a higher interim-belief compensation. The requisite s ingle-crossing
property is that—no matter the exogenous experiment—these indifference curves
are flatter for higher types, meaning that higher types are more willing to inflate their
report to induce a higher interim belief. Lemma A.1 in Appendix A establishes that
this property is assured by the following assumption that we will maintain:
(4)

∂  2  c(r, t) / ∂ r∂ t
1 .
  
    ≤ −  _
for t < 1 and t < r:  _
1−t
∂ c(r, t) / ∂ r

Condition (4) can be interpreted as saying that higher types have a sufficiently
large marginal cost advantage relative to marginal cost. All our cost assumptions are
satisfied by, for example, c( r, t)  = (r − t)  2.
Another Interpretation.—Although our model is posed as a communication
game, it can also be viewed as adding exogenous information to a variation of the
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Spence (1973) signaling model. In this interpretation, a worker possesses a private
trait, his type t (e.g., intelligence), which is indicative of binary job productivity.
An employer also observes a signal about that productivity (e.g., through an interview). The worker’s wage depends on the employer’s posterior on productivity
given the worker’s schooling level r and the employer’s signal s . The marginal cost
of schooling decreases in the characteristic t. While we assume that higher-type
workers intrinsically prefer acquiring more education, our analysis also applies if
all workers prefer less education; see Section IIID.
B. Equilibrium
We focus on the least-cost (fully) separating equilibrium, or LCSE, as is
standard. In such an equilibrium the sender’s pure strategy ρ
    :   [0, 1]  → ℝ+is strictly
increasing, with the “Riley condition” ρ
 ( 0)  = 0. For r ∈ [0, ρ(1)], the receiver’s
interim belief upon observing ris π(r) = ρ  −1( r). Without loss, we stipulate that
for r > ρ(1), π(r)  = 1. Standard arguments imply that the LCSE strategy ρ( ⋅ )
must satisfy the differential equation
∂ c(ρ(t), t)
∂ Es|t
 [β(s; t)]
(5)	
 _ρ′ (t)  =  _
   .
∂r
∂π
Equation (5) obtains from the binding local upward incentive compatibility constraints. The left-hand side is type t’s marginal cost of mimicking a slightly higher
type; the right-hand side is the marginal benefit, which comes from inducing a
higher receiver interim belief. This benefit is affected by the sender’s belief about
the exogenous signal s. Since ρ′ (t)  > 0and equation (5)’s r ight-hand side is strictly
positive, any solution has ρ(t)  > tfor t > 0.
Condition (4), which yields the requisite single-crossing property, guarantees that
equation (5) and the boundary condition ρ( 0)  = 0are not only necessary in an
LCSE but also sufficient (i.e., global incentive compatibility is assured). As standard
arguments imply that this boundary-value problem has a unique solution, we state
the following result without proof.
LEMMA 2: There is a unique LCSE.
C. Comparative Statics
How does (Blackwell) more informative exogenous information affect the
sender’s LCSE signaling strategy? The strategy is determined by the local upward
incentive constraints. Intuitively when type tmimics a slightly higher type t + ε,
it creates disagreement: type tviews the receiver’s interim belief t + εas higher
than the truth. IVP implies that texpects a more informative exogenous signal
to correct that interim belief by more, and so t’s gain from inducing that interim
belief is lower under a more informative experiment. Formally, we have the following result.
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LEMMA 3: If s̃ is drawn from a more informative experiment than s, then for
any t < 1,
∂ Es|t
 [ β(s; t)] 
∂ Es̃ |t[ β(s̃ ; t)] 
     ≤  _
   .
	
 _
∂π
∂π

PROOF:
IVP (Theorem 1) implies that for any t < 1and small ε > 0,
	
Es̃ |t[ β(s̃ ; t + ε)] − Es̃ |t[β(s̃ ; t)] ≤ Es|t[β(s; t + ε)] − Es|t[β(s; t)],

because E
 s̃ |t[β(s̃ ; t)] = Es|t[β(s; t)]  = t. (Theorem 1’s ordering hypotheses hold
because both the sender’s and receiver’s information have the MLRP.) The result
follows from dividing both sides of the inequality above by ε and taking ε → 0. ∎
Lemma 3 implies that more informative exogenous information reduces the
right-hand side of equation (5). Since each type expects a smaller marginal benefit from inducing a higher belief in the receiver, the solution ρ
 to the differential
equation (5) with boundary condition ρ(0)  = 0is pointwise lower. It is therefore
intuitive, and proved in Appendix A, that the following result holds.
PROPOSITION 2: In the LCSE, every sender type bears a lower signaling cost
when the receiver’s exogenous information is more informative.
Consequently, every sender type is better off when the receiver’s information
improves, because in the LCSE every type texpects the receiver’s posterior to be t
regardless of the exogenous information distribution. Plainly, the receiver is also
better off (given any von N
 eumann-Morgenstern payoff function) with better exogenous information.
D. Discussion and Implications
A very similar analysis, with the same conclusion as Proposition 2, would apply
if we had instead assumed à la Spence (1973) that all types would choose r = 0
under complete information. Specifically, we could have instead assumed the signaling cost function c (r, t)satisfies ∂ c / ∂ r > 0, ∂  2  c / ∂ r  2  > 0, and ∂  2  c / ∂ r∂ t < 0
and required the inequality in (4) to hold for all t < 1and r > 0.
One reason we study costly lying is that the analysis also extends to a bounded
report space, which is natural there. Suppose the sender’s report must be in [0, 1], his
type space. Then, given our original assumptions on c( ⋅ ), there is no fully separating
equilibrium; in particular, recall that for a strictly increasing strategy ρ
 , a solution
to equation (5) entails ρ(t)  > tfor all t > 0. In a previous version of this paper
(Kartik, Lee, and Suen 2019), we analyzed a salient equilibrium that extends the
LCSE to this case: there is separation up to some cutoff type t  ∗  < 1and pooling
on r = 1thereafter. The sender’s strategy in the separating region is unchanged:
ρ( 0)  = 0, and equation (5) holds. The cutoff t  ∗is determined by its indifference.
More informative exogenous information now not only lowers every type’s s ignaling
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cost but also raises the cutoff t  ∗ (again due to IVP, similar to the logic that reduces
the benefit of pooling in Section II). The larger separating region means the sender’s
signaling is more informative.
One can adapt the analysis to study multi-sender signaling when each sender gets
a conditionally independent signal. Suppose some senders are upward biased, others
are downward biased, and each chooses a report in [0, 1].11 This model applies to
competing persuaders with falsification costs in various domains: lobbyists, media,
legal parties, etc. From each sender’s perspective, the other senders’ reports are
endogenous experiments. The logic underlying Proposition 2 implies that senders’
strategies are strategic complements: in equilibria where each sender uses a cutoff
strategy as described above, each sender reveals more and bears a lower signaling
cost when other senders reveal more. The receiver thus learns more with more senders; importantly, beyond the obvious direct benefit of adding a sender, there is an
indirect benefit of existing senders revealing more. Each sender’s e x ante welfare
is also higher, as his equilibrium signaling cost decreases while the receiver’s average posterior is unaffected. Furthermore, if any sender’s cost increases in a suitable
sense (for example, if sender i’s cost is ki  c(r, t)and ki  > 0 increases), then not only
does that sender reveal more but so do all other senders.
Although it may seem unsurprising that better receiver information reduces a sender’s incentive to incur falsification costs, we emphasize that Proposition 2 relies on IVP.
Online Appendix B.2 shows that if the sender’s payoff is not linear in the receiver’s
posterior, or if the receiver’s information violates MLRP (in a multi-state extension
of the model), then better exogenous information can increase the sender’s marginal
benefit from mimicking a higher type, leading to higher equilibrium signaling costs.
Frank (1985, section III) also suggests that better exogenous information can
reduce dissipative signaling. Weiss (1983) studies when exogenous information
allows for separating equilibria even absent any heterogeneity in the direct costs of
signaling; his focus is not on comparative statics. Daley and Green (2014) emphasize the stability of nonseparating equilibria when there is “double crossing” of
appropriate indifference curves, contrary to the single crossing assured by our condition (4). Truyts (2015) shows that better exogenous information can exacerbate
dissipative signaling when signaling is noisy.
IV. Conclusion

IVP is instructive more broadly than for just the two applications with asymmetric information developed in this paper. In an earlier version (Kartik, Lee, and Suen
2019), we used IVP to study voluntary disclosure with either concealment or disclosure costs.
We close by briefly commenting on a domain with symmetric information. Consider Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow 2011). Alonso
and Câmara (2016) develop a general analysis under heterogeneous priors; see also
Onuchic ⓡ Ray (2019). When the sender’s preferences are s tate independent and
11
A downward-biased sender’s payoff is − E[ω | r, s]− c(r, t). The relevant strategy for this sender is given by
 (1) = 1, the analog of equation (5) with the r ight-hand side’s sign flipped, and all types below some cutoff poolρ
ing on report r = 0. For any t ∈ ( 0, 1), ρ(t) < t, that is, a downward-biased sender deflates his report.
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concave in the receiver’s posterior expectation, there is no scope for beneficial persuasion under common priors. Alonso and Câmara (2016, section 4.3) show that
this observation does not hold generically with heterogeneous priors and at least
three states. Our Theorem 1 delivers additional insights. For example, if the priors
are likelihood-ratio ordered, then among M
 LRP experiments the sender prefers
less informative experiments when facing a favorable receiver, that is, one whose
prior dominates (respectively, is dominated by) the sender’s if the sender’s utility is increasing (respectively, decreasing) in the receiver’s posterior expectation.
Consequently, in that scenario, an uninformative experiment is optimal if all and
only MLRP experiments are available.12
Appendix A. Proofs
PROOF OF THEOREM 1:
We prove the statement about
A’s expectations; B’s are analogous. It is sufficient

   ̃
to establish E
   A[   m  sB]   ≤ EA    [m  sB̃  ]  , as the other two inequalities are implied by the
observations in the paragraph preceding Theorem 1.
  LR  β  sB̃    and hence β
   sÃ    ≤
  FOSD  β  sB̃  . 
Since β
 A ≤L R βB , it follows that for any s̃ , β  sÃ    ≤
s̃ 
(Here, β  i  denotes i’s posterior after observing signal s̃ .) Experiment ’s MLRP
implies that its distribution of signals is increasing in the state in the sense of FOSD.
Consequently, conditional on any s̃ , the probability distribution ascribed by Bto signals s dominates in FOSD ascribed by A. To prove that, let p( s | ω)denote the signal
density of experiment and p̃ (s̃  | ω)that of the garbling ̃ . For notational simplicity,
we proceed assuming there is a nonnegative kernel q (s̃  | s) with ∫ s  ̃   q(s̃   | s)ds̃  = 1 for
all s, such that for any state ω,
	p̃ i (s̃ ) = 
∫s  q(s̃ |s)p(s|ω)ds.

For i = A, B, let p i (s) ≡ 
∑ω    p(s | ω)βi  ( ω) and p̃ i (s̃ ) ≡ ∑ω    p̃ (s̃  | ω)βi  (ω). The
conditional density of any signal s from 
 given any signal s ̃ from ̃ , using prior
βi  , is
q(s ̃ | s)pi(s)
 
  .
	qˆ i(s | s )̃  =  __________
p ĩ (s )̃ 

Therefore,

p Ã (s )̃  pB (s)
qˆ B (s | s )̃ 
 
   .
	 _______  =  _____  _____
p B̃ (s )̃  pA(s)
qˆ A(s | s )̃ 

12
Following our discussion after Theorem 1, priors ordered by FOSD are sufficient for optimality of an uninformative experiment (Onuchic ⓡ Ray 2019, also note this point restricting attention to a subset of M
 LRP experiments) but not for the broader preference ranking of MLRP experiments by their informativeness.
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As 
 satisfies MLRP and β
 A  ≤LR
  βB 
, the ratio 
pB(s)/pA(s)is increasing.13
Therefore, for any s ,̃ qˆ A( · | s )̃  ≤LR qˆ B( · | s̃ ),which implies qˆ A ( · | s )̃  ≤FOSD qˆ B( · | s̃ ).
 ’s MLRP), it follows that for any s̃ ,
As the mean m  sB   is increasing in s (by 

(A1)	
E  A[   m  sB   ∣ s̃ ] ≤ E  B[   m  sB   ∣ s̃ ].


Experiment 
being more informative than 
̃ implies that for any sand s̃ ,
s,s ̃
s,s ̃
s
 
m  B  
, where m
   B  denotes 
B’s posterior mean having observed (
 s, s̃ ).
m  B = 
 Bs̃  ∣ s̃ ] = m  sB̃    by iterated expectation, it follows from (A1) that for any s̃ ,
As E  B[   m  s,
E  A[  m  sB   ∣ s̃ ] ≤ m  sB̃   .


(A2)

Taking the expectation in (A2) over s̃ using the prior βA  yields
̃ 

̃ 

	
E  A[   m  sB]   = E  A[  E  A[   m  sB   ∣ s̃ ]] ≤ E  A[  m  sB̃  ]  ,




where the equality is by iterated expectation. ∎

∂ c(r, t) / ∂ r
____________
LEMMA A.1: For t < 1 and t < r,   
    strictly decreases in t.
∂ Es|t
 [β(s; π)] / ∂ π

PROOF:
Differentiating (3) and manipulating, the sender’s marginal rate of substitution
between rand πis given by
∂ c(r, t) / ∂ r
∂ c(r, t) / ∂ r
____________
  
  
    .
	
      = π(1 − π)  _________________
∂ Es|t
 [β(s; π)] / ∂ π
Es|t[β(s; π)(1 − β(s; π))]

Differentiating with respect to t, noting that Es|t[ ⋅ ]  = t[ ⋅ ] + (1 − t)[ ⋅ ], and rearranging, we see that for t < m, the marginal rate of substitution strictly decreases
in t if
Es|1[β(s; π)( 1 − β(s; π)) ] − Es|0[β(s; π)( 1 − β(s; π)) ]
∂ 2 c( r, t) / ∂ r∂ t _________________________________________
  
   <       
       .
 ___________
∂ c(r, t) / ∂ r
t Es|1[ β(s; π)( 1 − β(s; π)) ]  + (1 − t) Es|0[ β(s; π)( 1 − β(s; π)) ] 

Since both Es|1[β(s; π)(1 − β(s; π))]and Es|0
 [β(s; π)(1 − β(s; π))]are strictly positive, for t < 1the right-hand side of the above inequality is strictly greater than
0 − Es|0[β(s; π)( 1 − β(s; π)) ]
1 .
   
       = −  _
	
 _________________________
1
−
t
0 + (1 − t) Es|0[ β(s; π)( 1 − β(s; π)) ] 
13

To confirm this, observe that

pB (s)
βA(ω)p(s | ω) βB (ω)
∑ω    βB (ω)p(s | ω)
βB (ω)
	 _____  =  _______________
  
    = 
∑     _______________
  
     ______  = 
∑  βA (ω | s)_____
 
    .
ω
βA (ω)
pA (s)
ω ∑ ω′
∑ω′
  β
  A(ω′)p(s | ω′)
 β
  A(ω′)p(s|ω′)βA (ω)

Fix any s′ > s. The experiment’s MLRP implies βA( · | s) ≤FOSD βA( · | s′). The LR ordering of priors implies
βB (ω)/βA (ω) is increasing. Therefore, pB(s′)/pA(s′)≥ pB (s)/pA(s).
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So if (4) holds, the marginal rate of substitution strictly decreases in tfor t < 1
and t < r. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
If we show that ρ(t)decreases pointwise when the right-hand side of equation (5)
decreases for all t, then the result follows from Lemma 3. Accordingly, let ρ
 ̃ (t) and
ρ( t)be two solutions to equation (5), with ρ̃ (0)  = ρ(0)  = 0, where ρ̃ solves equation (5) with a pointwise lower right-hand side. For any t > 0, if ρ̃ (t)  = ρ(t) then
ρ′ (t)  ≥ ρ̃  ′ (t)  > 0. This implies that at any touching point, ρmust touch ρ̃  from
below. Consequently, by continuity,
	
ρ(t′ ) ≥ ρ̃ (t′ )for t′   > 0 ⇒

ρ(t) ≥ ρ̃ (t)for all t ≥ t′ .

Now suppose, to contradiction, that ρ
 ̃ (tˆ ) > ρ(tˆ )for some for tˆ   > 0. It must hold
ˆ
that ρ̃ (t) > ρ
(t)for all t ∈ (0, t ). Since ∂   2c/∂ r  2  > 0and ρ̃ corresponds to a lower
right-hand side of equation (5), it follows from equation (5) that ρ̃  ′ (t)  < ρ′ (t) for
all t ∈ 
(0, ˆt ). But then

	
ρ ̃ (tˆ )  − ρ(tˆ ) = 
∫0t    [ρ̃  ′ (t) − ρ′ (t)]  dt < 0,
ˆ

a contradiction. ∎
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